1 The Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., SECOND AMENDMENT No. C08-1613RSM 11 FOUNDATION, INC., ADRIAN J. COOMBES, ROELOF KROES, PHILIP MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 12 GRADY, FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FED. R. CIV. P. 65 13 **Plaintiffs** 14 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ٧. 15 NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR STATE OF WASHINGTON, LIZ LUCE, DIRECTOR, DEPARMENT OF LICENSING **JANUARY 23, 2009** 16 and PAUL D. AYERS, CHIEF OF POLICE ISSAQUAH POLICE DEPARTMENT, 17 Defendants. 18 Plaintiffs National Rifle Association of America, Inc., et al., by counsel, pursuant to 19 Rule 65, Fed. R. Civ. P., hereby move this Court to issue a preliminary injunction requiring 20 Defendant Director of Licensing Liz Luce forthwith to renew or issue alien firearm licenses to 21 Plaintiffs Adrian J. Coombes, Philip Grady, and such other lawful permanent resident aliens 22 who may apply pursuant to RCW § 9.41.170. Plaintiffs further move the Court to issue a 23

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preliminary injunction restraining Defendant Police Chief Paul D. Ayers from enforcement of RCW § 9.41.170 and RCW § 9.41.070(4) as applied to lawful permanent resident aliens.

Introduction

The individual Plaintiffs are lawful permanent resident aliens who own firearms.

Washington makes it a felony for an alien to possess a firearm without an Alien Firearm

License issued by the Director of Licensing. However, she refuses to issue such licenses.

Coombes' license expires on February 19, 2009, and Grady is unable even to apply for a license. Plaintiffs thus seek a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant Luce forthwith to issue said licenses. In the alternative, a preliminary injunction is sought against enforcement of RCW § 9.41.170, which makes it a felony for a non-U.S. citizen to possess a firearm without a license, and RCW § 9.41.070(4), which requires such license to qualify for issuance of a license to carry a concealed pistol.

Washington law and its application here violate the right of lawfully admitted resident aliens to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, denies them the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, and denies them the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by citizens as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).

Plaintiffs Coombes, Kroes, and Grady are aliens lawfully admitted into the United States for permanent residence. Declarations of Adrian J. Coombes ("Dec. Coombes,")

Roelof Kroes ("Dec. Kroes"), and Philip Grady (Dec. Grady), ¶ 1 of each. Plaintiffs National Rifle Association ("NRA") and the Second Amendment Foundation ("SAF") have numerous

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (C08-1613)— Page 2 Stephen P. Halbrook Attorney at Law 3925 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 403 Fairfax, VA 22030 Tel. (703) 352-7276 • Fax (703) 359-0938

1 members in the State of Washington, including lawful resident aliens. Declaration of Chris 2 W. Cox ("Dec. Cox), ¶ 3; Declaration of Alan M. Gottlieb ("Dec. Gottlieb"), ¶ 4. 3 Defendant Liz Luce is the Director, Department of Licensing, State of Washington. 4 Answer ¶ 8. Defendant Paul D. Ayers is the Chief of Police of the municipality of Issaquah 5 Washington, where Coombes resides, and as such enforces State law and is in charge of 6 issuing licenses to carry concealed pistols. 7 **Statutory Background** 8 Plaintiffs are "lawfully admitted for permanent residence," which means that each has 9 been "lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 10 immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws " 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). Aliens 11 with criminal records are inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 12 Revised Code of Washington ("RCW") § 9.41.170 provides in part: 13 (1) It is a class C felony for any person who is not a citizen of the United States to carry or possess any firearm, without first having obtained an alien firearm 14 license from the director of licensing. In order to be eligible for a license, an alien must provide proof that he or she is lawfully present in the United States, 15 which the director of licensing shall verify through the appropriate authorities. 16 $(2) \dots$ (b) Before issuing an alien firearm license . . ., the director of licensing shall 17 ask the local law enforcement agency of the jurisdiction in which the alien resides to complete a background and fingerprint check to determine the alien's 18 eligibility under RCW 9.41.040 to own, possess, or control a firearm. The law enforcement agency shall complete a background check within thirty days after 19 the request.... 20 21 The application for an immigrant visa must include a certification by foreign police authorities stating what their records show concerning the immigrant. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b). The Department of State searches for any 22 criminal history records for a visa applicant in the National Crime Information Center's Interstate Identification Index (NCIC-III), Wanted Persons File, and other files maintained by the NCIC. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1). 23

1 Violation is punishable with five-years imprisonment and a \$10,000 fine. RCW § 2 9A.20.021. In addition, RCW § 9.41.070 provides in part: 3 (1) The chief of police of a municipality or the sheriff of a county shall within thirty days after the filing of an application of any person, issue a license to such person to carry a pistol concealed on his or her person within this state for 4 five years from date of issue, for the purposes of protection or while engaged 5 in business, sport, or while traveling. . . . The applicant's constitutional right to bear arms shall not be denied, unless: (a) He or she is ineligible to possess a firearm under the provisions of RCW 6 9.41.040 or 9.41.045;² . . . 7 (2) The issuing authority shall check with the national crime information center, the Washington state patrol electronic data base, the department of 8 social and health services electronic data base, and with other agencies or resources as appropriate, to determine whether the applicant is ineligible under RCW 9.41.040 or 9.41.045 to possess a firearm and therefore ineligible for a 9 concealed pistol license. . . . 10 (4) . . . A person who is not a citizen of the United States shall meet the additional requirements of RCW 9.41.170 and produce proof of compliance 11 with RCW 9.41.170 upon application. . . . 12 In contrast with Washington law, federal law treats lawful resident aliens identical with citizens. United States v. Sandoval-Barajas, 206 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2000), explains: 13 14 the federal statute [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)] applies only to some aliens, those who are "illegally or unlawfully in the United States," but the Washington statute [RCW § 9.41.170(1)] applies to all aliens, "any person who is not a 15 citizen." . . . The federal statute does not prohibit legal aliens from possessing 16 firearms, but the Washington statute does, unless they obtain licenses. Thus a legal alien may be in compliance with the federal statute yet in violation of the 17 Washington statute. **Facts** 18 Plaintiff Coombes has held an Alien Firearms License (AFL) and a Concealed Pistol 19 License (CPL) since 1999. His AFL expires on February 19, 2009. Answer ¶ 15. His CPL, 20 which must be renewed by the Issaquah Police Department, expires on April 1, 2009. 21 Defendant Chief of Police Paul D. Ayers will not renew the license without a valid AFL. 22 23 ² These provisions prohibit firearm possession by convicted criminals and other dangerous persons.

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Coombes is employed in Service and Sales at Wade's Eastside Guns & Bellevue Range, 1 2 Belleview, WA, and will lose his job if his licenses are not renewed. He has a valuable 3 firearm collection which he will lose if his AFL is not renewed. Dec. Coombes, ¶ 3-5. Plaintiff Kroes has an Alien Firearms License which expires in 2010. Answer ¶ 17. 4 5 Plaintiff Grady, who recently moved to Washington, sought to obtain an application 6 for an AFL, but was refused because the Director of Licensing is no longer issuing such 7 licenses and the application forms were not available. He has a valuable firearm collection 8 which he cannot lawfully possess in Washington without an AFL. Dec. Grady, ¶ 2-4. 9 Coombes, Kroes, and Grady are members of Plaintiff NRA. There are other lawful 10 resident aliens in Washington who are members of Plaintiffs NRA and/or SAF, own firearms, 11 and are required to have an alien firearm license. Dec. Cox, ¶ 6; Dec. Gottlieb, ¶ 4. 12 Other than the citizenship requirement, plaintiffs fulfill all other requirements under 13 Washington Law to possess firearms and to obtain a license to carry a concealed pistol. They 14 also meet all requirements under the laws of the United States to possess firearms. Dec. 15 Coombes, ¶ 8-14; Dec. Kroes, ¶ 7-13; Dec. Grady, ¶ 6-12. 16 The Department of Licensing (DOL) no longer will issue an alien firearm license 17 pursuant to RCW § 9.41.170. Answer ¶ 22. Its website states: 18 We are unable to issue alien firearms licenses at this time. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has told law enforcement agencies it is against federal 19 law to use federal databases for background checks if they share the results with a non-criminal justice agency such as the Department of Licensing. As a 20 result: Law enforcement agencies cannot perform the background checks required by state law for issuing an alien firearms licenses. We cannot 21 complete the application process or issue alien firearms licenses. http://www.dol.wa.gov/business/firearms/faalien.html 22 Answer ¶ 22. 23

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By email dated August 6, 2008, Bruce W. Tanaka, Firearms Unit Program Manager, Department of Licensing, wrote Coombes that the DOL cannot access FBI criminal history records through local law enforcement and thus would not issue or renew an Alien Firearm License to Coombes. Tanaka warned: "DOL's hands are tied. I would recommend you not be in possession of your weapons when and if your license expires. . . . [I]f charged and convicted of a class C felony, you would never be able to be in possession of a firearm and it's a deportable offense." Answer ¶ 23.

As a proximate cause of RCW §§ 9.41.170 and 9.41.070, the refusal of the Department of Licensing to issue Alien Firearm Licenses, and the resultant inability of the Chief of Police to issue Concealed Pistol Licenses to non-citizens, Plaintiffs Coombes, Kroes, and Grady, together with other members of Plaintiffs NRA and SAF who are lawful resident aliens, will suffer irreparable injury in that they will imminently lose valuable property and will no longer be able to possess firearms for recreational purposes and lawful self defense. In addition, Coombes will lose his job.

ARGUMENT

"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008).

I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS

A. Washington's Firearms Prohibitions Deny the Equal Protection of the Laws to Lawful Resident Aliens

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Except for Kroes, whose AFL expires in 2010.

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RCW § 9.41.170(1) and § 9.41.070(1) and Defendants' refusal to issue firearm licenses thereunder deny to Plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of this claim, which is Count Two of the Complaint.

"[T]he term 'person' in this [Fourteenth Amendment] context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside." *Graham v. Richardson*, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (denial of welfare benefits). "[C]lassifications based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." *Id.* at 372. This is the case "whether or not a fundamental right is impaired." *Id.* at 373.

Similarly, *Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission*, 334 U.S. 410, 421 (1948), invalidated a state law excluding "aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting all others to do so." "*Takahashi* and *Graham* stand for the broad principle that 'state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress." *Toll v. Moreno*, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982) (invalidating state law denying tuition benefits to nonimmigrant aliens)

In contrast to federal laws, "State alienage classifications create a 'suspect class' to which we apply strict scrutiny." *United States v. Lopez-Flores*, 63 F. 3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995). Such "overriding national interests" as immigration and foreign relations "justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State." *Id*.

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In a case similar to the case at bar, a state law which discriminated against lawful resident aliens in issuance of firearm licenses was held violative of equal protection. Say v. Adams, 2008 WL 718163, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20183 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (Case 3:07-cv-00377-TBR, copy attached hereto for the Court's convenience, Attachment A). State law authorized the state police to issue and renew licenses to carry a concealed deadly weapon ("CCDW license"), applications for which were obtained from the county sheriff of one's residence. Only U.S. citizens were eligible for a license. 2008 WL 718163 at *1.

The citizenship requirement was passed to gain federal approval to allow a CCDW license holder to purchase a firearm without a background check by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS"). A NICS check for a non-citizen requires an "Illegal Alien Query" ("IAQ") through the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The state police conducted a NICS check for a CCDW license, but not an IAQ check. When Plaintiff Say, an alien with lawful permanent residence, attempted to apply for a CCDW license, the county sheriff told him that he was ineligible due to the citizenship requirement. Say then sued the head of the state police and the sheriff. *Id*.

Federal law requires a NICS check for receipt of a firearm, but exempts purchasers who have certain state-issued permits, such as a CCDW license. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1), (3). The citizenship requirement was imposed so that the state police could conduct their own non-NICS background check to issue such licenses, but in doing so they were unable to check the IAQ for lawful alien status. Say at *3. The court held, id.:

The Court cannot find that a state's interest in substituting a state background check for a federal background check is compelling enough to justify creating a classification that discriminates against a suspect class.

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Furthermore, the citizenship provision is not narrowly tailored to achieve this governmental interest. A blanket prohibition discriminating against aliens is not precisely drawn to achieve the goal of facilitating firearms purchases when there exists a nondiscriminatory way to achieve the same goals. As discussed below, if the Kentucky State Police undertakes some administrative burden, it is possible to allow permanent resident aliens to obtain a CCDW license, and still meet the requirements necessary to allow CCDW holders to avoid the NICS inquiry at the time of purchase.

State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 124 Wash. 2d 368, 378, 879 P.2d 283 (1994), which involved an unlawful alien, flatly stated that "RCW 9.41.170 is not necessary to safeguard the State's interest in keeping 'firearms out of dangerous hands'." The state's public safety argument was "weak," but the record was too limited to find the statute facially violative of equal protection. *Id.* at 380.

By contrast, Plaintiffs here are lawful permanent resident aliens, and alien firearm licenses are no longer being issued. As applied now, RCW § 9.41.170 is an absolute prohibition on possession of a firearm by an alien, like similar state laws which have been invalidated on equal protection grounds. *Chan v. City of Troy*, 559 N.W.2d 374, 379-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), held that "the statute, which prohibits the purchase of pistols by all noncitizens, fails to distinguish between dangerous noncitizens and those noncitizens who would pose no particular threat if allowed to purchase the weapons." *Id.* at 380. "Had the statute excluded only illegal aliens, as opposed to all noncitizens, it may well have passed constitutional muster." *Id.* n.3.4

⁴ See also People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246, 247 (Colo. 1936) ("the act wholly disarms aliens for all purposes. The state . . . cannot disarm any class of persons or deprive them of the right . . . to bear arms in defense of home, person, and property."); Sandiford v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 117, 118-19, 225 S.E.2d 409 (1976) (invalidating presumption for possession of sawed-off shotgun by alien: "We see no rational connection between a person's place of birth and his disposition to commit offensive or aggressive acts."); State v. Poolsawas Chumphol, 97 Nev. 440, 442, 634 P.2d 451 (1981) (invalidating prohibition on possession of pistol: "A person does not exhibit a tendency toward crime merely because he or she is a noncitizen"); People v. Rappard, 28 Cal.

In sum, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their equal protection claim.

B. Washington's Firearm Prohibitions Deny Lawful Resident Aliens the Full and Equal Benefit of Laws and Proceedings for the Security of Person and Property, Contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)

RCW §§ 9.41.170(1) and 9.41.070(1) and Defendants' refusal to issue firearm licenses thereunder violate 42 U.S.C. §1981(a), which provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens" Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on this claim, which is Count Three of the Complaint.

Originally enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the provision only protected "citizens," but was amended in 1870 to protect "persons." "Congress chose with care the word 'persons' to replace 'citizens' in the statute when, in reenacting the 1866 Civil Rights Act, it extended the safeguards of the civil rights statutes to aliens." *Sagana v. Tenorio*, 384 F.3d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 2004). *Takahashi*, 334 U.S. at 419-20, explained:

The protection of this section has been held to extend to aliens as well as to citizens. Consequently the section and the Fourteenth Amendment on which it rests in part protect "all persons" against state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because of alienage or color. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide "in any state" on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.

Lawfully admitted resident aliens "are entitled to the full and equal benefit of all state laws for the security of persons and property." *Graham*, 403 U.S. at 378. This would include not only the lawful possession of firearms, but also the ability to work, as does Coombes, in a

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App.3d 302, 304-05, 104 Cal.Rptr. 535 (1972) (invalidating prohibition on possession of concealable firearm: "a person does not . . . show a tendency toward crime simply because he is not a citizen of this country.").

firearms business just as citizens may do. "The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work." *Id.* at 379 (citation omitted).

Washington's provisions which recognize the right of citizens to possess firearms constitute "laws and proceedings for the security of person and property" in the meaning of §1981(a). Wash. Const., Art. I, § 24, provides: "The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired" RCW § 9.41.070(1) provides for a license to carry a concealed pistol "for the purposes of protection or while engaged in business, sport, or while traveling" RCW § 9.41.170 recognizes the same interests by *not* making it a felony for a *citizen* to possess a firearm without a special license.

A purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to prevent states from prohibiting firearm possession to disfavored classes. See discussion below of *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2809-10 (2008). A companion enactment with similar phraseology was the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, which stated in part: "[T]he right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens . . . without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery" § 14, 14 Stat. 176-177 (1866), quoted in *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2810 (noting that "The understanding that the Second Amendment gave freed blacks the right to keep and bear arms was reflected in congressional discussion of the bill").

The Freedmen's Bureau Act "re-enacted, in virtually identical terms for the unreconstructed Southern States, the rights granted in §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866." *Georgia v. Rachel*, 384 U.S. 780, 797 n.26 (1966). *See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409, 424 n.31 (1968) (noting identical objectives of Freedmen's Bureau Bill and Civil Rights Act). Section 1981 not only forbids discrimination, it also protects substantive rights. ⁵ "If we are to give [the law] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language." *Id.* at 437 (brackets in original). ⁶

In sum, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that the discriminations in RCW §§ 9.41.170(1) and 9.41.070(1) and the unavailability of licenses thereunder violate § 1981(a).

C. Washington's Firearm Prohibitions Infringe on the Right of Lawful Resident Resident Aliens to Possess Arms Under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments

RCW §§ 9.41.170(1) and 9.41.070(1) and Defendants' refusal to issue firearm licenses thereunder, as alleged in Count One of the Complaint, infringe on Plaintiffs' Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, which applies to the States and political subdivisions thereof through the Fourteenth Amendment. This guarantees an individual right to possess firearms by law-abiding persons, including lawful permanent resident aliens.

1. Lawful Permanent Resident Aliens are Protected by the Second Amendment

Lawful resident aliens are among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), explained:

⁵ "Senator Trumbull's bill would, as he pointed out, 'destroy all [the] discriminations' embodied in the Black Codes, but it would do more: It would affirmatively secure for all men, whatever their race or color, what the Senator called the 'great fundamental rights'...." *Jones*, 392 U.S. at 432.

⁶ See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 672 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Black Codes "forbade owning firearms").

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The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms".... While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, ... refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.

More specifically, "aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country." *Id.* at 271. "But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders." *Id.* (citation omitted).⁷

In holding that the Second Amendment guarantees the individual right to possess firearms, *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2796, recalled the above formulation that "the people" "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community."

Heller overrules this Circuit's rulings that the Amendment protects only a "collective" state right to maintain militias and not an individual right. See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, reh. denied, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).

2. The Second Amendment Applies to the States Through the Fourteenth Amendment

Nineteenth-century cases stating that the First and Second Amendments do not apply
to the States "did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our
later cases." Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23. Relying on those same cases, Fresno Rifle &

⁷ "Aliens who are lawfully present in the United States are among those 'people' who are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights" *Id.* at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 729-31 (9th Cir. 1992), held that the Second Amendment is not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment so as to protect the right to keep and bear arms from State infringement. Heller supercedes Fresno Rifle.⁸

a. The Right To Keep And Bear Arms Is A Fundamental Right

"By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects." *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2798. Moreover, "the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a *pre-existing* right." *Id.* at 2797.

The explicit nature of the right precludes use of the rational-basis standard of review. "Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms." *Id.* at 2818 n.27.

Noting that "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right," *Heller* continued: "The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute." *Id.* at 2817-18. The prohibitions and actions here are far worse—for aliens, all firearms of all classes are banned, in the home and everywhere else.

⁸ "Where intervening Supreme Court authority is clearly irreconcilable with our prior circuit authority" – including when the irreconcilability is in the "mode of analysis" and not just in square conflict with the specific holdings – "a three-judge panel of this court and district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled." *Miller v. Gammie*, 335 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003).

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b. The Fourteenth Amendment Was Intended To Protect the Right To Keep and Bear Arms From State Infringement

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supercede *Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore*, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833), which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. 9 "In the aftermath of the Civil War, there was an outpouring of discussion of the Second Amendment in Congress and in public discourse, as people debated whether and how to secure constitutional rights for newly free slaves." *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2809-10, citing S. Halbrook, *Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876* (1998). This included Second Amendment rights which were violated by the Southern Black Codes. *Id.* at 2810. 10

The Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 protected the right to "personal liberty, personal security, and . . . estate, . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms" *Id.* at 2810. This was passed by over two-thirds vote of the same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought to guarantee the same rights. *Id.* ("With respect to the proposed Amendment, Senator Pomeroy described as one of the three 'indispensable' 'safeguards of liberty . . . under the Constitution' a man's 'right to bear arms for the defense of himself and

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⁹ "Representative [John] Bingham . . . explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment with the case of *Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore*, 7 Pet. 243 (1833), especially in mind." *Monell v. Dep't of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658,686-87 (1978). On the same page of that speech, Bingham characterized "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" as one of the "limitations upon the power of the States . . . made so by the Fourteenth Amendment." Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 84 (Mar. 31, 1871).

¹⁰ See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 247-48 & n. 3 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Fourteenth Amendment intended to eradicate the black codes, under which "Negroes were not allowed to bear arms.").

¹¹ Halbrook, Freedmen, 41-42.

¹² Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 423-24, 436 (1968).

family""). The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect Second Amendment rights from State infringement.

c. Nineteenth-Century Cases "Did Not Engage in the Sort of Fourteenth Amendment Inquiry Required by Our Later Cases"

Heller clarifies that the Court has left open whether the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and implies that it does. Nineteenth-century cases holding that the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments do not directly apply to the states did not consider whether such rights are incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), held that "members of a white mob" could not be convicted "for depriving blacks of their right to keep and bear arms," since the Second Amendment only applied to the United States. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812. "With respect to Cruikshank's continuing validity on incorporation, . . . we note that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases." Id. at 2813 n.23.

Heller added that two later decisions "reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government." *Id.* (citing *Presser v. Illinois*, 116 U. S. 252, 265 (1886), and *Miller v. Texas*, 153 U. S. 535, 538 (1894)). *Presser* made no mention of the Fourteenth Amendment in this discussion. 116 U.S. at 265. *Miller* agreed that the Second and Fourth Amendments did not apply directly to the states, but refused to consider whether they applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 153 U.S. at 538.¹³

¹³ "If the Fourteenth Amendment limited the power of the States as to such rights [to bear arms and against warrantless searches] as pertaining to citizens of the United States, we think it was fatal to this claim that it was not set up in the trial court." *Id.*

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Since these cases "did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases," Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23, this Court must do so.

d. Heller Supercedes Circuit Precedent Rejecting Incorporation

Heller supercedes the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 729-31, which rejected incorporation of the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fresno Rifle stated that since Miller predated the first incorporation case, "there is no reason to believe that Miller left open the incorporation question any more than Cruikshank or Presser." Id. at 730. Yet none of these cases even considered the incorporation question.

As the Ninth Circuit noted in *Silveira*, 312 F.3d at 1067, *Cruikshank* and *Presser* were "decided before the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause," adding: "*Cruikshank* and *Presser* found that the Second Amendment restricted the activities of the federal government, but not those of the states. . . . *Cruikshank* and *Presser* rest on a principle that is now thoroughly discredited." See Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1193 & n.3 & 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, C.J., specially concurring) ("We should . . . revisit whether the requirements of the Second Amendment are incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").

Moreover, "in interpreting a constitutional provision, the fundamental principle of construction is to give the provision the effect intended by the framers and the people adopting it." *Tom v. Sutton*, 533 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1976). *Heller*'s statement that "nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the

¹⁴ Id., citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002) (noting that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller "came well before the Supreme Court began the process of

Second Amendment" also applies to the Fourteenth Amendment, and indeed Heller adds: "It should be unsurprising that such a significant matter has been for so long judicially unresolved. For most of our history, the Bill of Rights was not thought applicable to the States" 128 S. Ct. at 2816. 15 Fresno Rifle refused to consider what it characterized as "remarks by various legislators during passage of the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Civil Rights act of 1871." 965 F.2d at 730. This included, for instance, Senator Jacob M. Howard's introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment which referred to "the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution; such as . . . the right to keep and bear arms. . . . The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (May 23, 1866), quoted in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 16 Moreover, far more was involved than "remarks" - the Freedmen's Bureau Act, supra, protected from State infringement "personal liberty, personal security, and . . . estate . . ., incorporating certain provisions of the first eight amendments into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and . . . they ultimately rest on a rationale equally applicable to all those amendments"). 15 "The Court has not hesitated to re-examine past decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964). ¹⁶ "A substantial part of the debate in Congress on the Fourteenth Amendment was its necessity to enable blacks to protect themselves from White terrorism and tyranny in the South. . . . When the state itself abets organized

terrorism, the right of the people to keep and bear arms against a tyrant becomes inseparable from the right to

self-defense." Silveira, 328 F.3d at 577 (Kleinfeld, C.J., joined by C.J.s Kozinski, O'Scannlain, & T.G. Nelson,

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dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

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including the constitutional right to bear arms " The Fourteenth Amendment also protects from state infringement the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property." *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 485 n. (1965). No state may violate the "constitutional right to personal security, a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment." *Wood v. Ostrander*, 879 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1989). At the core of the right to personal security is the right to have arms: "The Second Amendment embodies the right to defend oneself and one's home against physical attack." *United States v. Gomez*, 92 F.3d 770, 774 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996).

In sum, *Heller* supersedes the *Fresno Rifle* holding that the Second Amendment is not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it relied on cases that "did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases." *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23.

e. The "Fourteenth Amendment Inquiry Required By Our Later Cases" Mandates Incorporation of the Second Amendment

Most substantive Bill of Rights guarantees have been incorporated because they are explicitly recognized and thus fundamental. A right is "fundamental" if it is "explicitly or

See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.") (quoting 2 J. Kent, Commentaries 1 (1827)), rev'd on other grounds 494 U.S. 259 (1990).

¹⁸ See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 237 (1897) (Just Compensation Clause of Fifth Amendment among the "implied reservations of individual rights . . . which are respected by all governments entitled to the name."); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment from impairment by the states."); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) ("The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of

implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 33 (1973). No constitutional right is "less 'fundamental' than" others, and "we know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values" Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982). 19

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992), explains that "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution," including free speech and press and "the right to keep and bear arms."

Most procedural Bill of Rights guarantees have also been incorporated,²⁰ excluding those not inherently required for a fair procedure.²¹ "In resolving conflicting claims concerning the meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (Sixth

the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws [respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof]."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (same for Establishment Clause).

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¹⁹ "To view a particular provision of the Bill of Rights with disfavor . . . is to disrespect the Constitution." *Ullmann v. United States*, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956).

²⁰ See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (Fourth Amendment rights "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty" and based on "the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples."), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

²¹ See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884) (Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury not required because due process "must be held to guaranty, not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property."); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases where the value in controversy exceeds \$20).

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Amendment right to jury trial in a criminal case incorporated).²² Like other substantive guarantees, the Second Amendment is not subject to the question of whether a particular procedure is necessary for due process.

In sum, since the Second Amendment encompasses an explicitly-guaranteed, substantive right, it meets the standards of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on incorporation of fundamental rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. Given *Heller*'s holding that a handgun ban violates the Second Amendment, Washington's ban on all firearms possession by lawful resident aliens cannot stand.

II. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUFFER IRREPARABLE INJURY

Plaintiffs are "likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief," Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374. Threatened with serious criminal penalties involving arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, they stand to loose valuable property and, in the case of Coombes, his job. They will not be able to possess firearms for any reason, including self defense.

"[A] plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an injunction will cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights." *Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't.*, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). *See Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court Carson City*, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) ("the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury' for purposes of the issuance of a preliminary injunction"); *Tom v. Sutten*, 533 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1976) ("all constitutional provisions are of equal

²² Accord Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) ("the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage").

III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES TIPS IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR

In this case, "the balance of equities tips in [Plaintiffs'] favor," *Winter*, 129 S.Ct. at 374. Being lawfully admitted for permanent residence and by having previous firearm licenses, Plaintiffs have been subjected to intensive background checks. No legitimate State interest is served by the denial of such licenses to lawful permanent residents or by applying criminal penalties against them for not having such licenses.

Say found that an injunction would require the state police to conduct a manual case-by-case background check on alien CCDW applicants, as well as update its electronic database software, amend its forms, and change its record check procedures. However, "any harm to others caused by the granting of a preliminary injunction is not substantial enough to justify the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights." Say, 2008 WL 718163, *4.

Say enjoined enforcement of the state law requiring applicants for a license to carry a concealed weapon to be a U.S. citizen. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Say v. Adams (Case 3:07-cv-00377-TBR, copy attached hereto for the Court's convenience, Attachment B). Defendants were also ordered to furnish Say with a license application and to "accept and process the application and issue the license in accordance with the established procedures for processing such application and issuing such license, but without requiring proof of United States citizenship." Id.

Any additional administrative burden required for Defendant Director of Licensing

Luce to issue or renew Alien Firearms Licenses would not be substantial. Enjoining

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Defendant Police Chief Ayers from enforcement of RCW § 9.41.170 against Coombes and similarly-situated persons would only remove a burden.

IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS TO UPHOLD CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The injunction sought "is in the public interest." Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374. "Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution." *Preminger v. Principi*, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). "[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights." *Sammartano*, 303 F.3d at 974 (citation omitted). The *Say* injunction was found to be in the public interest because "Plaintiff is asserting a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." *Say*, 2008 WL 718163, *4.

No public interest exists in denying firearm licenses to or prohibiting firearm possession by lawful permanent resident aliens. No such discrimination exists in the federal Gun Control Act, which prohibits firearm possession only to aliens who are (1) "illegally or unlawfully in the United States" or (2) "admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa," 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), and the latter prohibition is lifted if the alien is here "for lawful hunting or sporting purposes or is in possession of a hunting license." § 922(y)(2)(A).

Most alien gun restrictions were passed by the states in the early twentieth century "during an era of irrational fear and prejudice against immigrants." P. Gulasekaram, "Aliens With Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, & the Second Amendment," 92 Iowa L. Rev. 891, 908-09 (2007). RCW 9.41.170 was enacted in 1911. *Hernandez-Mercado*, 124 Wash. 2d at 376. "There is nothing in the 'statutory scheme' which establishes that the status of

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CONCLUSION The Court should issue a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant Director Licensing Liz Luce forthwith to renew or issue alien firearm licenses to Plaintiffs A Coombes, Philip Grady, and such other lawful permanent resident aliens who may a pursuant to RCW § 9.41.170. The Court should further issue a preliminary injunction restraining Defendant Police Chief Paul D. Ayers from enforcement of RCW § 9.41.070(4) as applied to lawful permanent resident aliens.	drian J. pply
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